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Civil wars do not only generate high death tolls, but also significantly affect the general 
population at large. Studies show that the effect of conflict on health is particularly large in 
civil wars and pertains over time. This paper uses an independently pooled cross sectional 
method to measure the effect of conflict on children’s health in Palestine. Overall, my 
analysis suggests that conflict has a negative impact on the health of children living in the 
affected areas; my results show that an increase in average deaths of 1000 over the lifetime of 
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Conflict continues to be one of the major concerns for the international community. 
Reduction in interstate wars has largely been replaced by intrastate wars. Civil wars have 
shown to have a larger death toll and more severe long-run effects than interstate wars. 
(Fearon & Laitin, 2003) In addition, there seems to be a new change in states and conflict: the 
involvement of a third party supporting one side in the conflict, and internationalizing the 
war. Involvement by another state often has the effect of prolonging conflicts as well as 
increasing casualty rates. (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) 
 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the conflicts in the world that have seen the most 
media attention over the last decades. The reasons for this might be many, but the 
involvement by other states in the conflict is thought to be one of them. The history of Jews 
and Palestinians go back to the beginning of time (Jericho, the oldest city in the world is 
located in Palestine), but there was no particular history of conflict between the two people, or 
between Arabs and Jews until the last century. (Harms & Ferry, 2005, s. 3) The conflict 
between the two groups started in the 20
th
 century with the Zionist movement and the 
persecution of Jews in Europe, the first Great War and the fall of the Ottoman Empire. 
(Waage, 2013, s. 12)  The history of the two people before the start of the conflict is 
important in its own ways, and many books have been written on this topic. However, an in-
depth history of Arabs and Jews before the years of conflict is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
Since the inception of the state of Israel, the Palestinian economy has been heavily dependent 
on the Israeli economy; also, the cost of the occupation for both parties involved has been 
enormous. (Israel has seen greater loss in more recent years) (Hever, 2010) Falling 
employment and GDP levels in the Palestinian territories have been remarkably large and 
variable after the intensification of the conflict in the beginning of 2000. Also, it became the 




Civil wars do not only generate high death tolls, but also significantly affect the general 
population at large. Studies show that the effect of conflict on health is particularly large in 
civil wars and pertains over time. (Ghobarah, Huth, & Russett, 2003) The effect of conflict on 
non-participation groups in the population is therefore important to study. In Palestine 40% of 
the population is, women of reproductive years and children under five. (Rahim, et al., 2009) 
Data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics show that stunting, low height for age, 
in children under five has increased from 7.5% in the year 2000 to 10.3% in 2010.
1
 The Gaza 
Strip had a 5% increase in stunting between the year 2000 and 2006. (Palestinian Central 
Bureau of Statistics, 2013)  
 
I use an independently pooled cross sectional method to measure the effect of conflict on 
children’s health in Palestine. With data on district level ranging from before the Intifada in 
2000 until the year 2010, I am able to exploit the fact that there have been some periods with 
low conflict intensity, and others with high conflict intensity; moreover, this varies across the 
different districts. The amount of conflict children in each district is exposed to will therefore 
differ from district to district and also over time.  
 
My results show that an increase in average deaths of 1000 over the lifetime of a child 
increases the chances of being stunted by 10 %. Factors like unemployment, illiteracy, and 
number of family members also affects a child’s health in a negative way. If the head of 
household is unemployed, the chance of the child being stunted increases by 1.4%. Higher 
education for the head of the household has a positive effect on a child’s health. A child 
residing in a household where the head of household has a bachelor degree or higher have a 
less probability of being stunted of 2.4 percentage points. 
 
Overall, my analysis suggests that conflict has a negative impact on the health of children 
living in the affected areas. This finding may not be surprising; but this certainly serves to 
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 A child is stunted when the height is less than normal for the age. Stunting is a measure of growth failure, due 







draw our attention to the fact that the costs of current conflict are (at least partly) borne by the 
next generation. In a way, this highlights the inter-generational issues involved in the 
“production” of conflict which are analogous – in principle – to concerns regarding climate 
agreements and environmental degradation. 
 
Section 2 gives a historical background on the Israel-Palestine conflict, which starts with the 
end of the First Great War and the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Section 3 gives a short 
overview of Palestinian socio-economic indicators in relation to the conflict. Section 4 
summarizes related literature on the effect of conflict on children’s health. Section 5 
introduces the methodological framework along with descriptive statistics. Section 6 shows 






2 Historical Background on the Israel-
Palestine Conflict 
The Israel-Palestine conflict has been going on for about 100 years. There are six key 
historical, cultural and contemporary factors that have shaped the region as we know it today: 
Islam, the Ottoman Empire, European Colonialism the foundation of the state of Israel, oil 
and the role of the USA. (Smith, 2006) It is not my idea, in this thesis, to go through all of 
these factors, but a glimpse of recent history is important to shape the foundation for 
understanding the relationships between Israel and Palestine. I will start this chapter by giving 
a short introduction to how the conflict started, and how it has progressed. Many events have 
been left out because of relevance and because an in-depth analyses of the conflict and 
neighboring countries is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
2.1 The fall of the Ottoman Empire (1918-1947) 
The Palestinian territories were under the Ottoman Empire before the first Great War (1914-
18). Ending the war in defeat to the western powers, the Ottoman Empire was divided and 
given to the victors; France and Great Britain. Palestinians living in the area had been 
promised a sovereign state if they helped the British and French defeat the Turks. Great 
Britain had, in the Balfour Declaration, also promised the same territory to the Jewish 
population
2
. (Harms & Ferry, 2005, ss. 69-71) After the war ended in 1919, the areas in the 
middle East was divided between Great Britain and France, with the idea that they would 
withdraw from the region giving the local population the power. Great Britain governed 
Palestine under a League of Nations mandate from 1920-1947, but with its promise to both 
the Jewish and Palestinian population they soon ran into difficulties in the region. In 1947 
Britain gave the territory to the United Nations (UN), leaving it up to them to find a solution 
to the dispute of the territory. (Harms & Ferry, 2005, ss. 86-89) 
 
                                                 
2
 The Balfour declaration came in the form of a letter from the British foreign secretary, Arthur Balfour, to a 
leader in the British Jewish community, Lord Rothschild. It states that Great Britain favored the establishment 
of a national home for the Jewish People in Palestine. The Balfour declaration is viewed as the most 





2.2 Creation of Israel (1948) 
The Jewish population wanted a Jewish home state, Eretz Israel, while the other Arab nations, 
especially king Abdullah of Jordan wanted an Arab great-kingdom existing of Transjordan, 
Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. (Waage, 2013, s. 102)While different solutions were put on the 
table, Palestinians and Jews fought to gain control of important cities, road networks, military 
areas and resources that the British military left when they withdrew. The situation was about 
to escalate to a Civil War in the area. (Waage, 2013, s. 108) 
 
Resolution 181 on the future government of Palestine was finalized by the General Assembly 
and proposed to the two parties. The Jewish population accepted the partition plan, while the 
Arab population did not. An extract of the resolution states: 
 
“Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the 
City of Jerusalem, set forth in part 3 of this plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two 
months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed 
but in any case not later than 1 October 1948.” (General Assembly, UN, 1947) 
 
David Ben-Gurion (the first prime minister) proclaimed the state of Israel on 14
th
 of May 
1948 with support from the two superpowers the United States and the Soviet Union. The 
Arab Liberation Army did not support the creation of an Israeli state on the land of Palestine, 




In the beginning of the political history of Israel, there was one dominant part; the Mapai 
party, (The Worker’s Party of the Land of Israel) later known as the labor party. The Mapai 
party was a centrist, secular party and its leader Ben-Gurion, positioned himself in the middle 
of the political map. (Sandler & Mollov, 2004) Every Israeli prime minister came from Labor 
until 1977, when Menachem Begin, founder of the Likud party, won the elections. (ibid)  
 
                                                 
3
 The Arab Liberation Army, lead by Fawzi al-Qawuqji, was an army of volunteers from Arab countries that 
fought on Palestinian side in the 1948 war. (Wikipedia) 
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Figure1: Resolution 181; partition plan 
for Israel and Palestine. The Arab 
population did not agree on the plan. 
Soruce: (BBC News) 
 
Figure 2: New borders after the 1948 
War.Source: (BBC News) 
 
2.3 Expansion of land (1948 war) 
 
The war in 1948 between Israel and the Arab nations was the first official war between Arabs 
and Jews. The Palestinians, or any of the surrounding states, did not accept the solution of 
dividing the land into two sovereign states. The Jewish population on the other hand accepted 
the division, but was not happy about the amount of land they had received in the partition. 
(Waage, 2013, ss. 100-104) This was the start of a continuous conflict between the two 
people: a conflict of land, resources, demography and survival.   
 
Most of the wars between Israel and Palestine have very different narratives. The war in 1948 
is called the Nakba (the catastrophe) by Palestinians, and the Milkhemet Ha’atzma’ut (the 
independence war) by Israelis. The one narrative is about Palestinian loss of land, and 
creation of the refugee problem, the other of a war of independence and creation of a safe 
homeland for Jews without persecution. Both narratives are important and interesting in its 







The war left many Palestinians as refugees. Either internally displaced within the Palestinian 
territories, or as refugees in surrounding countries.
4
 The area of the West Bank came under 
Jordanian control, including East Jerusalem with its religious places. The Gaza Strip came 
under Egyptian control. No sovereign Palestinian state was created. (Harms & Ferry, 2005, ss. 
96-99) 
 
The essential problems created in this first war between the two nations are still today the 
main issues that keep peace processes at a stand still: the Palestinian refugee problem, 
demographic challenges of upholding a majority of Jews in Israel, the political, economic and 
religious center of Jerusalem, and safety and sovereignty. 
 
2.4 The six-day war (1967) 
In 1967, Israel and Palestine had been in peace for 11 consecutive years. The borders looked 
more or less the same as they did after the war in 1948. The six-day war changed this reality 
and gave the new borders, as we know them today. It also secured Israel’s position of power 
in the Middle East. (Waage, 2013, s. 332)  
 
The Palestinian people had not achieved much in regards of creating statehood after 1948. 
The refugee’s from 1948 had not been given the opportunity to go back to their villages, and 
the land that they had lost was still under Israeli control. The UN begged international actors 
for support to handle the big masses that had been forcefully removed from their homes 
during the war in 1948. (Waage, 2013, s. 334) The Palestinians felt they had no support 
locally or internationally, and wanted to create their own liberation movement. The 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) were 
established in 1964 under the supervision of the Egyptian president, Gamel Abdel Nasser. 
Moreover, the resistance came from the Palestinian people through the political party, Fatah. 
Established in 1959, Fatah was inspired by guerilla warriors in Algerie and Vietnam and 
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 During the 1948 war, 700 000 Palestinians left their land; this was the origin of the refugee problem. There is 
a big dispute about whether they left by choice or were forced of their land by Israeli troops. What is not in 
dispute though, was that they were never allowed to return after the war ended. (Harms & Ferry, 2005, s. 99)   
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wanted to provoke the Israeli government and force the Arab nations to liberate Palestine. 
Several attacks were executed on Israeli land from the beginning of 1965 until the war started 
in June 1967. The attacks from Fatah were retaliated by Israel with great force in neighboring 
countries where there were a great number of Palestinian refugees. This created unrest and 
tension in the region, especially within Arab countries where the Palestinians felt they had no 
support. (Waage, 2013, ss. 336-338) 
 
Israel attacked Egypt on June 5, 1967. It took Israel four days to gain control of Gaza and the 
Sinai dessert, two days to fight Transjordan and gain control of the West Bank and Jerusalem, 
and five days to fight Syria and gain control of the Golan Heihgts. Palestine had lost all its 
land to Israel, had a new wave of refugees and had lost their policial, religious and economic 
center: Jerusalem. (Waage, 2013, ss. 352-355) 
 
UN resolution 242 was the outcome of the peace talks after the six-day war. After many 
attempts, the resolution was passed, but did not in any way solve the problems. An extract of 
the resolution explains the lack of solutions: 
 
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict 
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and 
acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of 
every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized 
boundaries free from threats or acts of force; 
2. Affirms further the necessity 




The resolution does not indicate from which territories Israel needed to withdraw. It does not 





possibilities of interpreting this resolution in several 
ways make it clear that it was impossible to make a 
clear defined resolution that all parties involved would 
sign. 
 
The conflict was for the most part relatively calm 
between 1968 and 1986 in the West Bank and Gaza. 
However, this was not true for Israel and the Arab 
states that kept fighting through the entire period. 




2.5 The first Intifada (1987-1993) 
The first Palestinian uprising against the Occupation since the start in 1967 came in 1987. The 
Intifada (which means “shaking off” in Arabic) was characterized by civil disobedience.5  
Mass arrests of key leaders within the different organized groups eventually calmed down the 
situation in 1991. During the time of the uprising 1987-1993, Israeli military forces had killed 
more than 1000 Palestinians, with many more wounded. Palestinian militants suspected for 
collaborating with the Israelis had killed 250 people. (Middle East Research and Information 
Project, 2001) 
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 Hundreds of thousands of women, men and children demonstrated in the streets, refused to pay taxes, 
introduced massive boycott of Israeli products, and threw stones and Molotov Cocktails (Petrol bombs) 
towards the Israeli military. The uprising started in Gaza, but spread quickly to the West Bank and Jerusalem. 
(Middle East Research and Information Project, 2001) 
 
Figure 3 Map of Palestine/Israel after the 
1967 war. Sinai was later given back to 




2.6 The Oslo accords (1993-2000) 
The peace process that was a direct effect of the first intifada was a series of negotiations 
between PLO and the Israeli leadership. There are two agreements that are important to 
mention to understand the conflict: Oslo 2 and the Paris economic protocol of 1994. These 
agreements give many of the answers to how the Palestinian economy has been affected by 
the Occupation. Neve Gordon, an Israeli senior professor has renamed the Oslo years: 
“Outsourcing the Occupation”. By this, he means that Israel turned from a policy of direct 
occupation to a policy of indirect occupation, using new Palestinian leadership as a control 
organ. (Gordon, Israel's occupation, 2008, s. 169) 
 
Israel changed its policy and methods of negotiations in three important ways. For the first 
time ever, since the start of the Occupation in 1967, PLO was part of the negotiations. 
Second, Israel formally recognized “legitimate and political rights of the Palestinian people”. 
(Rynhold, 2007)This is an important part of the protocol as it states that Palestinians have the 
right to an autonomous state. Third, a new security doctrine based on the European 
Community model institutionalized full integration of the two economies (1994 Paris 
Protocol), and joint security operations (Oslo 2 Interim Agreement). (ibid) 
 
Oslo 2 Interim agreement gave birth to the Palestinian Authority (PA)
6
. Israel agreed to 
withdraw from a few places in the West Bank and Gaza strip (WBGS) and give the 
Palestinians self-rule over these areas. Over a five-year time-period Israel would withdraw 
from more and more areas, giving the newly founded government a chance to build and grow. 
New negotiations would then take place to agree on a final peace agreement with the 
remaining obstacles of Jerusalem, final borders, the refugee issue, the discussion of 
settlement-withdrawal from WBGS and the decision of whether Palestinians would have an 
independent state. The West Bank was divided into areas: A (3%), B (25%) and C (72%). A, 
was fully controlled by the PA. B, had Israeli military control and PA civil administrative 
                                                 
6
 The Palestinian Authority was designated to be the governing body in the West Bank and Gaza. It was formed 
in 1994 pursuant to the Oslo accords between the PLO and the government of Israel. The status of the 
governing body has yet to been reached due to lack of completeness of the peace process between Israel and 
Palestine. The Palestinian Authority no longer governs the Gaza Strip, following the elections in 2006 where 





control and C, had full Israeli military and civil administrative control over the area. Up until 
today, these area codes exist: They give a new dimension to the conflict, with a growing 
problem of the settlement population and closures between areas, people and land. (ibid) 
 
2.7 The second Intifada (2000-2003) 
The second intifada, like the first intifada was an uprising against the Occupation. The 
difference between the two intifadas was the political and diplomatic context of which they 
took place. Since the Oslo accords, much had changed on the political level: The Palestinian 
people had a governing body, which ruled small enclaves throughout the Palestinian 
territories. The event that started the intifada occurred in Jerusalem, when Ariel Sharon on 
September 28
th
 2000 entered the Al-Aqsa mosque on Haram al-Sharif, with more than 
thousand soldiers by his side
7
. Fighting broke out and seven Palestinians were killed in the 
clashes between security forces guarding Sharon and Palestinians guarding the Al-Aqsa 
mosque. (Waage, 2013, s. 462) 
 
The al-Aqsa intifada was a response to lack of economic development promised in the Oslo 
accords, lack of access to Jerusalem, denial of basic rights, and the problem of refugees and 
their homeland. (Al Jazeera, 2003)  
 
 
2.8 The Gaza War (December 2008 - January 2009) 
The Gaza war, or Operation Cast Lead, was an Israeli military attack on Gaza that happened 
between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009. This has been one of the bloodiest attacks 
in the conflict ridden history, and the power imbalance between the two sides gave massive 
international attention. 1389 Palestinians were killed, with 25% of these being children under 
                                                 
7
 The Al-aqsa mosque on the Haram al-Sharif (location) is the third holiest place for Muslims. For Palestinians, 
this is the most famous and important mosque for Friday prayers (Wikipedia) 
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the age of 18. More than 3 500 were wounded, and according to UN figures, 20 000 people 
left homeless. (B'Tselem, 2011) 
 
The background for the military attack was several years of rocket firing and artillery shells 
between Israel and Gaza. Since the beginning of the second intifada, and later with Hamas 
seizing power
8
, the restrictions on movement of goods and people in and out of Gaza have 
been severe. Since Israel’s Disengagement Plan (moving Israeli settlers and military out of 
Gaza) was completed in 2005, they also issued an order declaring the end of military rule, 
which left the government no longer responsible for the population living in Gaza. (B`Tselem, 
2011)  
 
The closure on Gaza has created a division in the Palestinian territories; physically by 
distance and restrictions on movement, but also on a political level between Hamas and Fatah. 
While previous times show a collective resistance against the Occupation, recent episodes 
have showed a less united strategy.  
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 Hamas is a political party in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS). Hamas won the elections in WBGS in 2006, 
but due to lack of recognition by the international community does not govern the West Bank. It is on the other 





3 Short overview of Palestinian socio-
economic indicators 
Wars and peace processes have not only shaped the degree of conflict directly through higher 
deaths, injuries and restriction of people and goods, but indirectly through social economic 
indicators like poverty, health and unemployment. The link between the conflict and the 
economy is therefore crucial for understanding the effect of the Occupation on the Palestinian 
people. A short overview of Palestinian socio-economic indicators will be given in this 
section. 
 
3.1  Early years (1948-1990) 
The internal borders of the 1948 war (borders between Israel and the Palestinian territories) 
were erased and new external borders between Israel and neighboring countries were drawn. 
This was especially true for the “economic borders” in the region, where the Palestinian 
economy was much more directly linked to the Israeli economy. (Arnon, 2007) Shir Hever, an 
Israeli economist and researcher points at five main reasons for the boom in Palestinian 
economy. 
1.  Israel followed an “open bridges” policy to minimize cheap exports to the Israeli 
market. Palestinians were enabled to keep trading with neighboring countries like Egypt 
and Jordan. 
2. Israel modernized the Palestinian economy by implementing innovations in forestry 
and water-systems, vaccinations of livestock, and land reclamation. 
3. An influx of Israeli consumers, due to cheap local products, raised the sales of goods 
in the territories. 
4.  Palestinian labor was employed in Israel, with considerably higher wages than could 
be obtained in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT).  
5. The oil-boom in 1973 gave opportunities for Palestinians to do skilled work in the 
wealthy neighboring countries. Remittances from these workers were often sent to family 
in the OPT, and promoted growth in the Palestinian economy. (Hever, 2010, ss. 8-9)  
14 
 
The growth in GNP per person was 4% in the West Bank and 6% in the Gaza Strip (1973-
1979). From 1980-1987 the growth rate in both areas were 2%. (Arnon, 2007) 
 
Together with these positive effects, came a number of restrictions. A system of permits, 
which still exists today, was put in place to control the movement of goods and people. 
Limitations were set on competing activities such as manufacturing to not endanger the Israeli 
industry. Israel also controlled the financial market, and financial institutions were not 
allowed in the OPT. (Hever, 2010, s. 10)  
This system of permits and control of goods and services, together with the limitations on 
economic activity have similar features to the colonial era in Europe from the 1500s to the 
mid-1900s.  
 
3.2 The Oslo Process (1993-2000) 
With the Paris protocol in place, the Israeli-imposed economic policy on the territories ended. 
This did not, on any means, give the Palestinians the opportunity to choose freely its 
economic policies. After the Interim Agreement (where Israel was to withdraw from certain 
areas of the territories) Israel opposed any defined borders. While the PLO preferred a Free 
Trade Area (FTA) between the Palestinian territories and Israel, Israel rejected any systems 
other than a customs union. The PLO eventually agreed to a customs union, on the condition 
that Palestinian laborers could still work in Israel. In the agreement it states that labor flow 
between the territories should be as normal as possible. (Arnon, 2007) Given the decrease in 
oil prices, the Israeli labor market was an important factor in the Palestinian economy. 
 
With the signing of the protocol, the involved parties anticipated an increase in economic 
integration between the two economies. The reality, though, was that many more restrictions 
were put in place by Israel, and the movement of goods and people between the territories 
was drastically reduced. Just one year after the Paris protocol, the number of Palestinian 





worked in Israel before 1994. In 1995-6 only 18% was able to keep their work permits. In 
Gaza, the numbers dropped from 40% in 1994, to 6% in 1995-6. (Arnon, 2007) 
 
The Palestinian economy has been deeply dependent on the Israeli economy. Prior to the 
second intifada, more than 90% of Palestinian import came through Israel. The Israeli 
government also collects taxes for the Palestinian Authority, which by the time of the second 
intifada made up about two-thirds of total government revenues. (The World Bank, 2011) 
These taxes have several times been withheld during peaks of the conflict or during times of 
political disagreement.  
 
In the late 1990s, as can be seen in figure 4, the Palestinian economy seemed to be increasing 
at a steady pace. Easing of closures and restrictions was one of the important factors for this 
increase. Another factor was the PA´s ability to strengthen its tax administration capabilities, 
which resulted in an increase of 14% of GDP between 1994 and 1999. (ibid) The start of the 
second intifada changed this reality. Curfews and restrictions on movement between cities 
limited economic activity and restricted laborers to reach their workplace. (ibid) The situation 
intensified even more in Gaza, when Israel withdrew its military and Israeli settlers. Though 
Gazans could move more freely within the Gaza Strip, the movement of goods and people in 
and out of Gaza was severely restricted. The lack of freedom of movement for Gazans 
pertains even today, and the gap in socioeconomic indicators between the West Bank and 





Figure 4: Real change in GDP in Gaza and the West Bank between 1995 and 2011, in real 2004 prices. 
Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 
 
3.3 International aid 
A large part of the GDP in the Palestinian economy comes from international donors. Until 
the 1990s, the main source of income from abroad came through the UN agency for refugees: 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). Since the 1948 war, UNRWA has 
offered shelter, food, health clinics and schools in refugee camps both in Gaza, the West Bank 
and surrounding Arab countries. During the years of “direct occupation” from 1967 to the 
beginning of the Oslo negotiations, almost nothing was donated to the territories. The main 
reason for the lack of international aid to Palestine was the view that aid would indirectly 
support the occupying power, Israel. (Hever, 2010) Since the agreements in the Oslo accords 
intended a sovereign state for the Palestinians, it also legitimized foreign support directed at 
nation building. Even though the aid was directed at state building, many donors early saw the 
need to shift the funding to a more emergency assistant based approach. The social impact of 
the severe economic and budgetary crisis led to this shift. (Le More, 2005) 
 
Between 1994 and 1999, the West Bank and Gaza Strip received about $2.8 billion in aid 








% change in GDP 





and Gaza Strip one of the largest recipients of aid in the world.
9
 (Fischer, Alonso-Gamo, & 
Ericson, 2001) 
 
Aid disbursements to the West Bank and Gaza, 1994-1999 in $US million 
          1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1994-99 
        
Disbursements through the 
development plan* 484 416 512 513 400 449   2 775  
Disbursements outside the 
development plan ** 127 131 135 141 153 160     847 
Total disbursements 611 547 647 654 553 609     3 622  
Donor financing (in percent of GNI) 15,4 13,2 15,8 14,7 11,6 11,9    13,4 
                
Figure 5: Source: (Fischer, Alonso-Gamo, 
& Ericson, 2001) 
       * Include all disbursements reported by Ministry of Planning and International 
Cooperation 
  ** UNRWA's operational budget 
        
Between 2001 and 2008, donor assistance to the Palestinian government increased by 500%. 
In 2009, 71% percent of all Gazans were beneficiaries of social assistance. In the West Bank 
only 12% of the population, or 20% of the poor, had access to social assistance. (The World 
Bank, 2011)Most of the aid that is given to Gaza does not go through governmental bodies, as 
most donors see the Hamas government as a terrorist organization. In the West Bank, the aid 
is channeled through NGO’s and the Fatah government.  
Figure 6 show the aid disbursements to the Palestinian Territories in $US million dollars from 
2003-2011. There has been a sharp increase in aid since the beginning of 2000. 
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 Only Israel and Jordan receives aid in the same magnitude as the Palestinian Territories, based on per capita 




Figure 6: Aid disbursements to the Palestinian Territories between 2003 and 2011. Source: (OECD.STAT) 
 
3.4 Situation today 
The Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and Gaza has an ongoing fiscal crisis that 
severely limits their ability to provide basic services to the population. Though the PA is 
making an effort to raise domestic revenues and control expenditures, they are strongly 
dependent on supportive actions of the Israeli government and international aid to keep basic 
services functioning. The private sector in Palestine is still weak due to lack of access to 
resources and markets. There is a need of both internal reforms in the PA and external 
reforms by the Israeli government to secure the growth of the economy. In 2010, the West 
Bank were back at its per capita GDP levels from 1999, while in Gaza, individual income still 
remains lower than it was in the late nineties. (The World Bank, 2012) 
 
Figure 7 shows the unemployment rates in the Palestinian territories between 1999 and 2011. 
Labor force participation is low and unemployment rates are still high in the territories. They 
have decreased since the Intifada years in 2000-2003, but are still above 20%. In Gaza, the 
unemployment rate was almost at a peaking 30% in 2011, though it has decreased from 







Figure 7: West Bank and Gaza Strip Unemployment from 1999-2011. For Gaza and West Bank the 
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4 Conflict and health 
About 16.2 million people are estimated to have died in battle during civil wars over the 
period 1945-1999. This is about five times the death toll compared to interstate wars in the 
same period. Civil wars have produced more refugee problems, and economic devastations 
are far greater, than during interstate wars. (Fearon & Laitin, 2003) Though there are 
challenges in describing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a civil war, there are also good 
reasons to treat it as such. This is particularly evident given the discussion on the Palestinian 
dependency of the Israeli economy, the refugee problem that has been created since the 
beginning of the conflict and because they both claim ownership over the same piece of land. 
Another important aspect is the lack of statehood for the Palestinian territories.  
 
There have been a number of studies on the relationship between economic performance and 
civil war as well as the driving forces, and continued prevalence, of conflict. Miguel et.al 
(Miguel, Satyanath, & Sergenti, 2004), Esteban et.al. (Esteban & Ray, Linking conflict to 
Inequality and Polarization, 2011) and Collier et.al (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) There has been 
paid less attention to the effect of conflict on children’s health, though there is a large 
literature confirming the long-run effects of conflict on health outcomes. (Ghobarah, Huth, & 
Russett, 2003) 
 
The indirect effects of conflict on children’s health are less obvious. Identifying these causes 
are often empirically challenging, and relatively little research have been done to find the 
effect of children’s exposure to conflict on health outcomes. (Akresh, Luchetti, & 
Thirumurthy, Wars and child health: Evidence from the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict, 2012)  
 
In Palestine 40% of the population is, women of reproductive years and children under five. 
(Rahim, et al., 2009) Data from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics show that 





to 10.3% in 2010.
10
 The Gaza Strip had a 5% increase in stunting between the year 2000 and 
2006. (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2013) 
 
A number of studies have been done on children’s mental health after a war. Thabet et.al 
showed that during the Al-Aqsa intifada, children who had experienced bombardments and 
home demolitions were more likely to have post-traumatic stress syndrome. Exposure to the 
war was the strongest socioeconomic predictor of post-traumatic stress. (Thabet, Abed, & 
Panos, 2002) Mental health is an important factor determining the overall health of a child, 
but physical health is also an important factor. Papers, books and reports on several 
socioeconomic indicators such as unemployment, education and health flourishes in both 
academia and popular literature. Many point to the conflict as an important indicator of falling 
development indexes, but there is a need for more research on the effects of conflict on child 
health. My contribution fits well with this need for more research.  
 
4.1 Related literature on conflict and child health  
The effect of conflict on children’s health has been studied in other countries and regions. In 
Eritrea, Akresh et.al (2012) find that the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia had a large 
negative effect on children’s height-for-age z-scores11. (Akresh, Luchetti, & Thirumurthy, 
Wars and child health: Evidence from the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict, 2012), In Nigeria, 
Akresh et.al (2012) find that the consequences of the war some 30-40 years ago are still being 
realized. They find that adults being exposed to war in early childhood exhibit reduced stature 
later in life. (Akresh, Bhalotra, Leone, & Osili, 2012) A study by Bundervoet et al. show that 
children exposed to the civil war in Burundi have on average 0.515 standard deviations lower 
height for age z-scores than children who have not been exposed to the war. (Bundervoet, 
Verwimp, & Akresh, 2009) 
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 Height-for-age z-scores are a measure of stunting in children. Stunting happens when a child is under 
nourished for a longer period of time. (Akresh, Luchetti, & Thirumurthy, Wars and child health: Evidence from 




Akresh et.al use height-for-age z-scores to find the effect of conflict on children’s health. 
They use a difference-in-difference estimation by war region and war intensity. War intensity 
measured as internally displaced individuals and war region as regions directly affected by the 
war or not. They also use months of war exposure to see the effect on children’s z-scores of 
one more month of exposure.  The main results in the paper, shows that children born during 
the war and living in a war region has 0.42 standard deviations lower height for age z-scores 
than children living outside a war region. (Akresh, Luchetti, & Thirumurthy, Wars and child 
health: Evidence from the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict, 2012)  
 
Health is widely recognized as being multi-dimensional with a combination of factors: 
Physical, mental and social well-being, genotype and phenotype influences
12
 as well as 
expectations and information. An individual’s behavior throughout the life course, together 
with health and socioeconomic environment are important factors that shape the health 
outcome of a person. (Strauss & Thomas, 2007)  
 
Height is positively correlated with cognitive achievement and schooling outcomes, such as 
enrollment at younger ages, less absent school days, more grades completed and better 
performance on tests. (Behrman, 1996) Behrman points out in his article, “The impact of 
health and nutrition on education”, that finding good results are difficult due to unobserved 
variables and the lack of experimental research on the topic. One should have less confidence 
in findings, given that the results are most likely to be biased. More information and better 
research material is needed to continue the search for the causal effects of health and nutrition 
on education. (ibid) 
 
Alderman et.al finds in a study done in Zimbabwe that improvement in height for age in 
children under five leads to increased height as young adults. They also find that children tend 
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to start school earlier, and complete more years of schooling. They get results that suggest a 
14% reduction in lifetime earnings due to less education and potentially reduced work 
experience. (Alderman, Hoddinott, & Kinsey, 2006)  
 
In a paper by Mendez and Adair, results show that children being stunted at early ages (2 
years or less) have lower test scores on cognitive ability tests later in life. They assess the 
relationship between stunting and cognitive development in Filipino children with 
anthropometric data collected between birth and age two and later by a cognitive ability test at 
ages 8 and 11. Findings show that the deficits on results by stunted children were less at age 
11 than at age 8, which might indicate that effects of early childhood stunting diminishes over 
time. (Mendez & Adair, 1999)  
 
The long run effects of stunting might differ depending on the environment and the society 
the child is brought up in. Both the severity of stunting and persistence of stunting might 
affect the long run effects. The society’s ability to handle children that are stunted and 
governmental programs or schools that can catch it at an early stage might influence the long 
run effects as well.  
 
4.2 A framework of potential determinants for poor 
anthropometric status 
A framework of potential determinants for poor anthropometric status is taken from a paper 
by Wamani et.al  (Wamani, Åstrøm, Peterson, Tumwine, & Tylleskär, 2006) Similar 
frameworks have been used in other papers, like (Frongillo, De Onis, & Hanson, 1997) and 
(Willey, Cameron, Norris, Pettifor, & Griffiths, 2009) and give a good overview of which 





Figure 7: Framework of potential determinants for poor anthropometric status, from the paper by (Wamani, 
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Distal factors, intermediate factors and proximal factors are all determinants that are thought 
to affect a child’s health. Distal factors have an indirect and a direct effect on anthropometric 
status.The study by Wamani et.al showed that stunting was determined by all three factors, 
while wasting and underweight were determined by proximal factors. (Wamani, Åstrøm, 
Peterson, Tumwine, & Tylleskär, 2006) This would suggest a higher emphasis on distal 
factors, combined with intermediate- and proximal factors when identifying the effect of 
determinants on stunting when data on these are available. I use mainly distal factors as 
controls in this paper, given that these factors both have a direct and indirect effect, and 




5 Data and Methodology 
5.1 Data and Methodology 
Two categories of datasets have been used in this paper. One is obtained from the Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) and contains individual data on children’s anthropometric 
data. The other is obtained from B’Tselem a human rights organization and contains data on 
fatalities in the Palestinian territories between 2000 and 2010. 
 
Demography and Health surveys have been used by the Palestinian Authority to map the 
demographic and health situation in the Palestinian territories from 1996 to 2010. Five 
different surveys have been conducted to map this change. I have used four of these surveys, 
mainly the year 2000, 2004, 2006, and 2010 for this analysis. The year 1996 has been 
excluded, since the variables and precision of location on households vary from the remaining 
years. Only parts of the surveys have been used: anthropometric data for children under five 
and household characteristics, as they give persistent variables for the four time periods. The 
health surveys are individually sampled, but the same stratification method has been used in 
all four surveys. The target population of the surveys is Palestinian families that usually reside 
within the Palestinian Territories. Palestinian refugees in camps outside the territories or in 




B’Tselem, an Israeli human rights organization has collected data on the fatalities that are due 
to the conflict between Israel and Palestine. All fatalities are measured as deaths to civilians 
by Israeli military or border police. Data include women, men and children, but no distinction 
has been made between these groups in this paper. Fatalities are used as a measure of 
“conflict intensity” and are categorized by area, region and locality. Region is categorized as 
West Bank or Gaza, and area is categorized as North West Bank, Central West Bank, South 
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West Bank, North Gaza and South Gaza.
14
 Locality describes whether the individual’s place 
of residence is rural, urban or city. The same layout has been used for the data on health, and 
from now on, the term “district” will be used to describe an individual’s place of residence. 
There are no districts in the Palestinian territories that have not been affected by the conflict at 
one point or another between 2000 and 2010. Definitions on region, area and locality are 
taken from the Demographic and Health Survey in 2000, and comparability has been obtained 
in merging.   
 
I use anthropometric data from the Demographic and Health Surveys to compute height-for-
age z scores for children less than five years. Height-for-age z scores are often used to assess 
whether or not a child is under nourished. (Strauss & Thomas, 2007) Other measures of 
undernourishment are weight-for-height and weight-for-age, or wasting.
15
 Wasting is often 
due to severe acute malnutrition, while height-for-age z-scores (HAZ) measures chronic 
malnutrition for children under five. (Seoane & Latham, 1971) There are few indications of 
acute malnutrition in the Palestinian population, and prevalence of wasting is therefore not 
considered in this paper.  
 
Height-for-age z scores are computed using “The WHO Child Growth Standards” (World 
Health Organization (WHO)) from 2007
16
, and are computed as follows:  
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 The areas include the following governorates: The North of West Bank include; Jenin, Tubas, Tulkarm, 
Nablus, Qalqiliya and Salfit. The Central of West Bank include; Ramallah and Al Bireh, Jerico and Jerusalem. The 
South of West Bank include; Hebron and Bethlehem. The North of Gaza include; Gaza North and Gaza City, and 
finally the South of Gaza include; Deir Al-Balah, Khan Yunis and Rafah. 
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 High weight loss is often due to acute malnutrition, and is measured in several different ways. The most 
commonly used measure is the weight-for-height, but measure of mid-upper arm circumference is also an 
indicator used to classify a child with wasting. (UNICEF) 
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Where Z-scoreiqm is the z-score for childi, at age in monthsm, given sexq. Heightiqm is the 
height of childi at agem given sexq, mheight is the standard mean of height from WHO 
standard (not from my sample) for a child given sexq and age in monthsm. The SDqm is the 
standard deviation from the WHO standard (not from my sample) for a child given sexq at age 
in monthsm. 
 
The z-score tells us how an individual’s height compares to the average height of an 
individual of the same age in the WHO Growth Standards The Z-score calculates the 
deviation from the mean WHO standard height, and is negative when the height of the child is 
below the mean height from the standard and positive when the child’s height is above the 
mean height from the standard. A child is considered stunted if it is more than 2 standard 
deviations below the standard mean, and severely stunted if it is more than 3 standard 
deviations below the standard mean.  
 
Data on fatalities are used as a measure of conflict. A child’s health is most likely affected by 
the number of fatalities in the region where it resides. Stunting is a measure of relative long 
term under nutrition, and average deaths affecting a child’s health is therefore most likely 
dependent on the age of the child and the district where it resides. This assumes that previous 
deaths in the district do not affect the younger children in the sample; while for older children 
fatalities in previous years as well as fatalities in current years affect their height-for-age. Let 
cind be the measure of exposure to conflict for childi in districtd in yearn. Let (n-n0(i)) be the 
child’s age computed as yearn (of the survey) subtracted by birth year n0(i). Let Njd be the 
summation of fatalities in district d in year j. j ranges from birth year of the child to yearn of 
the survey: 
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Cind therefore captures the average exposure of conflict for a child given their age and the 
district they reside.  
 
To control for socio-economic factors that might affect the health of a child, I include family 
specific characteristics. In particular, I include the size of the family, the education level, and 
employment status of the head of household. There is reason to believe that it is the head of 
household’s socio-economic status that has the biggest effect on a child’s health. Of course, 
there could be a gender bias depending upon cultural values in society. (For example, there is 
evidence of son preference in both India and China) However, this would not make any 
difference in my study as I use micro-data on one fairly homogenous cultural group, namely, 
Palestinians. 
 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 gives a description of the pooled cross sectional variables used in this study. Table 2 
and Table 3 give a description of variables divided by regions: West Bank and Gaza.
17
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Variable description pooled across all years 
Variable description Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
Dummy variable for children 
being stunted or not 
stunted 32309 .1115479 .3148142 0 1 
Avergage deaths in the district, 
given child's age 
average death 32309 60.27826 96.29282 0 417.67 
Child's age in months age in months 32309 29.93593 17.30583 0 60 
Number of family members in 
the household 
family members 39503 7.351087 3.152286 2 27 
Dummy for h.h being 
unempmloyed or not 
unemployment 39419 .2448058 .4299775 0 1 
Dummy for h.h being illiterate 
or not illiteracy 39503 .0348581 .1834227 0 1 
Dummy for h.h having higher 
education or not Higher education 39467 .1228621 .3282831 0 1 
Dummy for h.h having high-
wage labor or not 
High wage labor 39503 .1677341 .3736347 0 1 
              
Table 1: Variable description from the Health and Demographic surveys and the conflict data pooled 
across four years. For variable description per year, see Appendix 1 
 
Head of household is abbreviated to h.h in table 1. The first variable is a dummy for whether 
or not a child is stunted. It takes the value 1 if the height-for-age z-score is less than -2 (2 
standard deviations below WHO growth standards) and 0 for all other z values. The average 
death in the district, given child’s age ranges between 0 and 417.67 in the sample, with a 
mean value of 60.3. The child’s age in months ranges between 0 and 60, with a mean value of 
30. This indicates that the distribution of children by age is not unevenly distributed. Number 
of family members in the household is measured as number of individuals living in the same 





quite high, and this is typical for the Bedouin population in Palestine, where men often have 
more than one wife, and families tend to be quite large. (Abu-Bader & Gottlieb, 2009) 
 
Dummy for h.h being unemployed or not takes the value 1 if the head of household was 
unemployed at the time of the survey, and 0 otherwise. Dummy for household being illiterate 
or not takes the value 1 if the head of household is illiterate and 0 otherwise. Only 3.5% of the 
sampled population is illiterate, and this fits well with statistics from the Palestinian Central 
Bureau of Statistics. The illiteracy rate in the sample would most likely be higher had more 
women been registered as head of household in the sample. The illiteracy rate for Palestinian 
women was 11.1 percentage points higher than men’s illiteracy rate in 2000, (Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistics, 2013) and the percentage of female led households in the sample 
is only 1.84%. 
 
Dummy for h.h having higher education or not takes the value 1 if the head of household has 
a bachelor degree or higher. For all other levels of education it takes the value 0. 12.2 % of 
the sampled population has a bachelor’s degree or higher. Dummy for h.h having high labor 
or not takes the value 1 if the head of household had a high-salary occupation.
18
 16.7 % of the 
sampled population had a high-salary occupation at the time of the survey. 
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Variable description pooled across all years for the West Bank 
Variable Description  Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       Dummy variable for children 
being stunted or not 
Stunted 18768 .098945 .2985961 0 1 
Avergage deaths in the 
region, given child's age  
Average Death 18768 15.54745 22.46283 0 135.33 
Number of family members in 
the household 
Family Members 23112 6.865048 2.739099 2 27 
Dummy for h.h being 
unempmloyed or not 
Unemployment 23042 .2004166 .4003208 0 1 
Dummy for h.h being illiterate 
or not 
Illiteracy 23112 .0318882 .1757062 0 1 
Dummy for h.h having higher 
education or not 
Higher Education 23080 .0939775 .2918037 0 1 
              















Variable description pooled across all years for Gaza 
Variable description  Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       Dummy variable for children 
being stunted or not 
Stunted 13541 .1290156 .3352296 0 1 
Avergage deaths in the 
region, given child's age  
Average Death 13541 122.2757 121.6884 0 417.67 
Number of family members in 
the household 
Family Members 16391 8.036422 3.545015 2 27 
Dummy for h.h being 
unempmloyed or not 
Unemployment 16377 .3072602 .4613723 0 1 
Dummy for h.h being illiterate 
or not 
Illiteracy 16391 .0390458 .1937099 0 1 
Dummy for h.h having higher 
education or not 
Higher Education 16387 .1635443 .3698728 0 1 
              
Table 3: Variable description pooled across all years for Gaza 
 
 
Comparing the descriptive statistics for the two regions show that the dummy variable for 
children being stunted or not seems to be quite different in the two regions. For West Bank, 
the average prevalence of stunting is 9.8%, while it is 12.9% in Gaza. The average deaths in 
the region, given child’s age also show the same indications as prevalence of stunting, with 
mean of average deaths for a child being 15.5 in the West Bank compared to 122.3 in Gaza.  
 
For the socio-economic indicators of the head of household, we see that the mean number of 
family members is lower in the West Bank compared to Gaza. The sampled unemployment 
rate is 20.0% in the West Bank, while the corresponding number of unemployment for Gaza 
is 30.7%. The dummy for h.h being illiterate or not have a mean value of .032 in the West 
Bank which is a bit lower than the corresponding mean value for Gaza of .039. The rate of 
34 
 
head of households with higher education in the West Bank is .094, while the comparable 
number for Gaza is .164. 
 
I want to test whether or not there are significant differences in stunting, conflict and the 
socio-economic indicators between the West Bank and Gaza. I use a two sampled t-test, 
where I test the hypotheses H0: there is no significant difference between variable x in the two 
regions. Table 4 gives the t-tests for significance between the two regions.  
 
Two sampled t-test for different variables in West Bank and Gaza 
    Mean    
Variable description Variables Gaza West Bank t-test 
Dummy variable for children 













Dummy for h.h being 















Dummy for h.h having higher 















          
Table 4: Two sampled t-test for selected variables checking for signification between the regions West Bank and 
Gaza. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
From table 4, we can clearly see by the last column showing the t statistics, that all variables 
tested are significantly different (at the 1% level) between the West Bank and Gaza. Whether 





have an effect on stunting. Descriptive statistics in table 5 show the division of observations 




Variable description pooled all years for both Gaza and the West Bank 
Variable description Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       Dummy for whether a child 
resides in Gaza or not 
gaza 32309 .4190783 .4934159 0 1 
Dummy for whether a child was 
born after the war or not 
after war 32309 .6595685 .4738616 0 1 
       
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for children by region West Bank or Gaza, for whether or not they are born before or after 




The demographic and health data that is collected by the Palestinian Central Bureau of 
Statistics do not include the same households or individuals over time. A random sample is 
taken from the population at different times, and because of that I am not able to follow the 
individual’s history over time; this rule out using a panel data structure at the individual or 
household level. I pool the cross sectional data over the four time periods to obtain a dataset 
with observations on 32 309 children and their household characteristics. For each of the 
observations, I match the district conflict for where the child resides.  
 
There is reason to believe that children’s health within the same household are correlated. 
There is also reason to believe that children’s health within the same district is correlated. To 
control for this, I cluster the standard errors separately, in turn by household and by district 
when running the regressions. Both methods give similar result, and I therefore only report 
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 The survey from year 2000 is collected before the outbreak of the intifada in September 2000, and should 
therefore not be affected by the number of deaths during the Intifada. 
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the results clustering the standard errors by households in this paper. I use logit for most of 
my regressions given that my dependent variable is a binary outcome variable (0/1), but I also 
report the results when using OLS.  
Specification regression for the effect of conflict on children’s health is therefore: 
 
Yi =  β0  +  β1 conflictdi  +  γXi + τt + εi 
 
Where Yi is a dummy for childi , taking the value 1 if the child is stunted, zero otherwise. 
Conflictd is the average amount of conflict in district d for childi, dependent on the age of the 
child. Xi are the household level characteristics for childi, τt is time dummies for different 










First I report the results from the pooled independent cross sections data. Afterwards, I report 
results using the division of West Bank and Gaza to look at differences between the two 
regions. Table 6 shows the results of conflict on individual level, while table 7 shows the 
results of the two regions West Bank and Gaza. 
 
6.1 Results using pooled cross sectional 
 
Table 6 shows the results on individual level using pooled cross sectional data. The first 6 
columns report logit regressions while OLS is reported in the last column. All regressions 
have time-dummies and dummies for whether or not the father of the child is alive. The 
dummy for father alive or not is included to control for fatalities within the household that 
might directly affect a child’s health. The dependent variable is a dummy, Stunted, which 













          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit OLS 
                
Average death 0,001*** 0,001*** 0,001*** 0,001*** 0,001*** 0,001*** 0,0001*** 
 
(0,000) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Age in months  0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,001 0,000 
  
(0,313) (0,248) (0,235) (0,262) (0,391) (0,314) 
Family members 
 
0,030*** 0,026*** 0,026*** 0,024*** 0,026*** 0,003*** 
  
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Dummy for  
  
0,168*** 0,158*** 0,134*** 0,147*** 0,014*** 
unemployment 
   
(0,000) (0,001) (0,004) (0,005) (0,005) 
Dummy for h.h    0,121 0,105 0,143 0,012 
Illiteracy 
   
 (0,237) (0,306) (0,309) (0,323) 
Dummy for higher     -0,266*** -0,249*** -0,024*** 
Education 
     
(0,000) (0,001) (0,000) 
Dummy for well paid job 
      
0,001 
 
       
(0,929) 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Dummy for father alive YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        Adjusted R2 0,005 0,007 0,008 0,008 0,009 0,009 0,006 
        Number of observations 32 309 32 309 32 241 32 241 32 213 29 628 32 213 
                
        Table 6: Pooled cross sectional results. The dependent variable is the dummy stunted in all regressions. 
Time dummies included in all regressions and robust standard errors clustered at family level. 
Corresponding p-values are reported in brackets. *significant at 10%, **significant at 5% and 
***significant at 1%. Children with a height for-age z-score below -2 is considered stunted.  
 
The positive and significant coefficient for average death in all columns in table 6 indicates 
that the average fatalities from the conflict have a positive effect on a child’s probability of 
being stunted. This is also true when controlling for household characteristics as is evident 
from column (2) to (7). The coefficients for all regressions are significant at the 1% level. If 
fatalities over the lifetime of a child increase by 1000 deaths, the probability of being stunted 
increases with 0.1 points or 10%, which is apparent in column (7). Recall that the probability 
of being stunted from the descriptive statistics was 0.11. With an increase of fatalities by 
1000, the new probability of being stunted will be 0.21. There is no significant effect of the 






The coefficient of family size is positive and significant at the 1% level. Comparing this 
results with a paper by Sonalde Desai on the disadvantages children face coming from large 
families suggest that this can be expected. This is especially true if the birth-interval between 
siblings is short, and the government does not have public social and economic benefits for 
large families. (Desai, 1995)  
 
Whether or not the head of household is employed also has a positive and significant effect on 
the prevalence of stunting. A child living in a household where the head of household is 
unemployed has a 1.4% higher risk of being stunted everything else being the same, and all 
variables included as controls, as is evident from table 6 column (7). 
 
The effect of illiteracy of head of household has little effect on a child being stunted or not. 
The coefficients are not significant in any of the regressions. The reason for this is most likely 
the correlation between illiteracy and unemployment and illiteracy and higher education. 
There is reason to believe that by controlling for unemployment and higher education, 
illiteracy is implicitly controlled for already.  
 
Head of household’s with higher education show a negative and significant effect on a child’s 
stunting. A child has 2.4% less probability of being stunted if the head of household has a 
higher education. All variables controlled for, and everything else being the same, which is 
evident from column (7) in table 6.  
 






6.2 Results using regional differences 
 
Table 7 shows the results for differences in height-for-age z-scores and prevalence of stunting 
for children between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Recall from the descriptive statistics in 
chapter 5.2 that there were significant differences between stunting, conflict and household 
characteristics between the two regions. The results were reported in table 4, and showed that 
the test for significance between the two regions were significant for all variables tested.  
 
I use the height-for-age z-scores to see if there is any difference in the z-scores of children 
between the two regions, and before and after the Intifada which happened in year 2000
20
. For 
the first four regressions, I have used OLS on the dependent variable haz (height-for-age z-












                                                 
20
 The data from the 2000 survey was collected before the Intifada broke out, and should therefore not capture 






  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  HAZ HAZ HAZ HAZ STUNTED 
 
Gaza 0,090** 0,091** 0,075** 0,097*** 0,014** 
 
(0,011) (0,010) (0,036) (0,007) (0,013) 
After war 0,103*** 0,098*** 0,091*** 0,080*** -0,006 
 
(0,001) (0,001) (0,002) (0,007) (0,208) 
After war*Gaza -0,282*** -0,281*** -0,292*** -0,274*** 0,023*** 
 
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Illiteracy  -0,234*** -0,192*** -0,143** 0,015 
  
(0,001) (0,005) (0,037) (0,109) 
Higher education   
0,330*** 0,304*** -0,031*** 
 
  
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) 
Number of family 
members    
-0,028*** 0,003*** 
 
   
(0,000) (0,000) 
Adjusted R2 0,003 0,003 0,007 0,009 0,005 
Number of observations 28 751 28 751 28 724 28 724 32 281 
            
Table 7: The table shows the results for differences in height-for-age z-scores and prevalence of stunting 
between West Bank and Gaza after the Intifada in 2000. The dependent variable for column (1)-(4) is 
height-for-age z-scores, while the dummy stunted is the dependent variable in column (7). Standard errors 
are clustered at family level. Corresponding p-values are reported in brackets. *significant at 10%, 
**significant at 5%, and ***significant at 1%. 
 
 
I first examine the effect of residing in Gaza, as opposed to residing in the West Bank. The 
specification equation of the differences by region can be shown as: 
Yi =  β0  +  β1 gaza  + β2 after war + β3 after war*gaza + γXi  + µi 
Differentiating with respect to Gaza will give us the effect on yi of a child residing in Gaza. 






       
 = β1 + β3*after war 
Measure of after war was given in the descriptive statistics chapter, and reported in table 5. 
From the table, it is shown that 0.6595, or 66% of the observations were from the after war 
period. Calculating the effect of a child residing in Gaza on z-scores or stunting, therefore 














        
 
dy/d(gaza) -0.083 -0.087 -0.102 -0.101 0.010 
 
        Table 8: Effect of residing in Gaza as opposed to the West Bank on height-for-age z-scores and prevalence 
of stunting. 
 
From table 8, it is clear that residing in Gaza after the Intifada in 2000 has a negative effect. 
This is also apparent when including household characteristics as shown in column (4) and 
(5). A child that resides in Gaza has 0.1 lower height-for-age z-score than a child residing in 
the West Bank. Looking at column (5) in table 8 show that a child has a 1% higher probability 
of beings stunted than children living in the West Bank.  
 
Higher education and family members are still significant controls, with same signs as 
expected given the previous results from the pooled cross sectional regressions. Given that 











There are two main concerns which arise when using this kind of an empirical strategy: First, 
is the omitted variable bias that might exist due to lack of data, possibility of misspecification 
in the model and endogeneity. Second, is the possibility of reverse causation. 
 
Research has shown that severe grievances such as inequality and low income can lead to 
conflict. (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) (Esteban, Mayoral, & Ray, Ethnicity and Conflict: An 
empirical study, 2012) (Esteban & Debraj, Linking conflict to Inequality and Polarization , 
2011) There is also reason to believe that inequality and income have an effect on stunting. 
The lack of measures of inequality or income in my dataset can therefore lead to biased 
estimators. The lack of income measures in the dataset has been controlled for by using 
educational attainment and labor status as proxies for income. Inequality measures on 
household level or proxies for inequality for the entire period researched was not possible to 
attain.      
 
Because I measure the effect of conflict on children’s health and not general health in the 
Palestinian population, I do not see a reason to worry about the reverse causation problem in 
this paper. There is no reason to believe that children as young as five years participate in 






In my empirical investigation, I find that the effect of conflict on a child’s health is negative 
and significant using an independently pooled cross sectional analysis, based on the data from 
the Palestinian Territories. This is true also after including different socio-economic factors 
that might directly affect a child’s health. I use a measure of stunting, i.e. low height-for-age 
scores to measure a child’s health. A child has negative health outcomes when their height for 
age drops 2 SD below a standard mean given by the World Health Organization. I use z-
scores to calculate how much a child deviates from the standard mean, and a child is stunted 
whenever this z-score drops below -2.  
 
My results show that an increase in average deaths of 1000 over the lifetime of a child 
increases the chances of being stunted by 10 percent. Factors like unemployment, illiteracy, 
and number of family members also affects a child’s health in a negative way. If the head of 
household is unemployed, the chance of the child being stunted increases by 1.4 percent. 
Higher education has a positive effect on a child’s health. A child residing in a household 
where the head of household has a bachelor degree or higher have a less probability of being 
stunted of 2.4 percentage points.  
 
After the Intifada in 2000, I find that there are regional differences between children residing 
in the Gaza Strip and children residing in the West Bank. A child growing up in Gaza after 
the Intifada have a 1% percent higher chance of being stunted compared to children living in 
the West Bank in the same period.  
 
More research on the effect of conflict on health outcomes for children is needed. Research on 
long-run effects of stunting indicates that there are also long-run effects on educational status, 
work efficiency and adult stature. More research on the long-run economical consequences of 
conflict due to stunting is therefore needed. Another aspect that also needs more research is 
the effect of conflict on non-participatory parties like women. Given the link between young 
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Description Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dummy variable for children being stunted or not stunted 6175 .1110931 .3142729 0 1
Avergage deaths in the region, given child's age avgdeath 6175 11.25729 11.72565 0 51
Childs age in months age_month 6175 29.78057 17.44236 0 60
Number of family members in the household family_mem~s 7486 7.469944 3.051303 2 32
Dummy for h.h being unempmloyed or not unemployed 7486 .1553567 .3622686 0 1
Dummy for h.h being illiterate or not illiterate 7108 .3811199 .4856961 0 1
Dummy for h.h having higher education or not higher_educ 7486 .0882982 .283747 0 1
Variable description year 2000
Description Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dummy variable for children being stunted or not stunted 4824 .1017828 .3023937 0 1
Avergage deaths in the region, given child's age avgdeath 4824 74.69682 68.71218 0 232
Childs age in months age_month 4824 28.68595 17.46514 0 60
Number of family members in the household family_mem~s 5981 6.813576 2.833364 2 30
Dummy for h.h being unempmloyed or not unemployed 5981 .3029594 .4595762 0 1
Dummy for h.h being illiterate or not illiterate 5833 .3109892 .4629381 0 1
Dummy for h.h having higher education or not higher_educ 5949 .1195159 .3244218 0 1
Variable description year 2004
Description Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dummy variable for children being stunted or not stunted 10246 .1362483 .3430688 0 1
Avergage deaths in the region, given child's age avgdeath 10246 65.49234 80.91147 0 332
Childs age in months age_month 10246 30.14581 17.21776 0 60
Number of family members in the household family_mem~s 12483 7.775855 3.763273 2 34
Dummy for h.h being unempmloyed or not unemployed 12404 .3061916 .4609289 0 1
Dummy for h.h being illiterate or not illiterate 12052 .3142217 .4642244 0 1
Dummy for h.h having higher education or not higher_educ 12488 .1225977 .327988 0 1
Variable description year 2006
Description Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dummy variable for children being stunted or not stunted 11064 .0931851 .2907048 0 1
Avergage deaths in the region, given child's age avgdeath 11064 76.52246 130.9956 0 417.6667
Childs age in months age_month 11064 30.37328 17.21626 0 59
Number of family members in the household family_mem~s 13548 7.132344 2.667518 2 20
Dummy for h.h being unempmloyed or not unemployed 13548 .2123561 .4089906 0 1
Dummy for h.h being illiterate or not illiterate 13133 .3051854 .4605034 0 1
Dummy for h.h having higher education or not higher_educ 13544 .1436799 .3507778 0 1
Variable description year 2010
